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State Buy-American Laws-Invalidity of State
Attempts to Favor American Producers
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1970s the United States suffered a major reversal of
its role in international economics. Chronic trade deficits, a
battered dollar, cartelization of oil production, and persistent
domestic unemployment and inflation created a perception that
American economic strength was withering. That perception
included a notion that a large part of the nation's economic
troubles stemmed from import competition. At least partially
influenced by that notion,1 most states have acted to prefer
American producers over foreign competitors in bids for state
and local government procurement contracts.2 Access to a
strikingly lucrative market is at stake; current Department of
Commerce estimates place the value of the annual state and lo-
cal procurement market at $133 billion.3
The means by which states have sought to accomplish this
favoritism is not new. At the federal level, the Buy-American
Act has given preference to American producers in federal
procurements since 1933,4 while at the state level, two major
decisions prior to 1977 ruled similar state legislation unconsti-
tutional.5 More recently, the United States Congress approved
a Government Procurement Code as part of a multilateral trade
agreement,6 signed in Geneva, culminating fifteen years of in-
1. See Glen, Buy American Laws Clash With New Trade Code, NAT'L J.,
Jan. 13, 1979, at 60; Samuelson, A More Sophisticated Kind of Protectionism,
Washington Post, June 27, 1978, § E, at 1, col. 5.
2. See note 22 infra and accompanying text.
3. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 59 SURVEY OF CURRENT BusiNEss No. 7, at 41
(1979) (1978 figures from Table 3.7).
4. See Act of Mar. 3, 1933, ch. 212, §§ 1-3, 47 Stat. 1520 (current version at 41
U.S.C. §§ 10a-10d (1976)). A precursor to the Buy-American Act gave prefer-
ence to American producers in 1875. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 133, § 2, 18 Stat. 455.
5. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221,
225-29, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800, 805-06 (1969); Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Superior
Ct., 208 Cal. App. 2d 803, 818-20, 25 Cal. Rptr. 798, 80§ (1962).
6. Agreement on Government Procurement, April 23, 1979, reprinted in
MULTI-LATERAL TRADE NEGoTIATIoNs: INTERNATIONAL CODES AGREED TO IN GE-
NEVA, SWrrZERLAND (Joint Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as GOVERN-
MENT PROCUREMENT CODE].
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ternational negotiations.7 The Code was implemented through
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,8 and although it reduces the
impact of the federal Buy American Act,9 it does not cover
procurements by state and local governments, even those
financed by federal money.10 The Code's failure to restrict
state buy-Americanism, coupled with a recent New Jersey deci-
sion upholding that state's scheme," has created a general im-
pression that such state preferences are valid; five additional
states have passed new buy-American legislation in the past
two years,12 and no legal challenges have been reported since
the New Jersey decision.
This Note analyzes the validity of state buy-Americanism
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 13
the commerce clause, 14 and the federal foreign affairs power,'5
7. See S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
S. REP. No. 2491, reprinted in [1979] 6A U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3, 9-14.
For a summary of the background of the Code and the trade package of which
it is a part, see S. REP. No. 249, supra, at 1-6.
8. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (to be codified in scattered sections
of 19 U.S.C.). The Code itself is not self-executing, but required implementing
legislation-Title M of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979-to become effective.
Therefore, the text of the Act, not the Code, is United States law. See GovERN-
MENT PROCUREMENT CODE, supra note 6, Part IX, 4(a), at 156; S. REP. No. 249,
supra note 7, at 36. See generally L TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIoNAL LAW § 4-
4, at 167-68 (1978).
9. See 19 U.S.C-.A §§ 2511-2518 (West Supp. 1979). Specifically, the Trade
Agreements Act authorizes the President to waive application of American
preferences in federal procurements for nations meeting certain conditions.
The most notable of these conditions is that the foreign nation reciprocate by
allowing American producers to compete freely for its government contracts.
Id. § 2511(b) (1) (B). See S. REP. No. 249, supra note 7, at 133-35.
10. See S. REP. No. 249, supra note 7, at 132. State and local governments
are not among the covered governmental entities listed in the Code itself. See
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT CODE, supra note 6, Annex I, at 221.
11. K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist Water Supply
Comm'n, 75 N.J. 272, 289-93, 381 A.2d 774, 782-89 (1977), appeal disnissed, 435
U.S. 982 (1978).
Another court reached the same result, but its analysis does not warrant
extensive comment here. In American Inst. for Imported Steel, Inc. v. Erie
County, 58 Misc. 2d 1059, 297 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1969), a New York court rejected a
commerce clause attack but relied on virtually no commerce clause case law.
Instead, the court based most of its analysis on an analogy to a 1915 decision
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, People v. Crane,
214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427, a.ffd sub nom. Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915)
(upholding a New York statute that prohibited the employment of aliens by
public works contractors). The court also disregarded the GATT issue with vir-
tually no discussion. This Note, therefore, discusses the decision no further.
12. See note 20 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 24-67 infra and accompanying text.
14. See notes 68-116 infra and accompanying text.
15. See notes 117-152 and accompanying text. In some states, buy-Ameri-
can requirements may also be in conflict with statutory or constitutional re-
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and concludes that each theory-particularly the latter two-
provides an independent ground for invalidating state buy-
American legislation. The Note focuses on the New Jersey de-
cision because it is now the central authority for the validity of
such state legislation. The issue of whether buy-Americanism
is wise economic policy is not discussed;16 only the legal issues
are considered.
There are several types of buy-American provisions. One
type may be termed an "absolute" form of buy-Americanism.
Such a restriction essentially bans any government procure-
ment of foreign-produced goods. A California statute that had
this effect was ruled unconstitutional in 1969; 17 currently, only
South Dakota appears to maintain an absolute form.18 A more
common form may be termed "limited" buy-Americanism. The
New Jersey statute exemplifies this form, giving preference to
American products only when practical and when the cost of
the American product is not unreasonably higher than the for-
eign product.19 Indiana, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
West Virginia all have statutes providing for limited buy-Amer-
ican preferences.20 Some of the restrictions are limited to one
product only. The Pennsylvania statute, for instance, applies
only to procurements of steel. 2 1
Because buy-Americanism may be accomplished by stat-
ute, administrative rule, or simply by the inclusion of specific
requirements in individual state contracts, an exact catalogue
of state restrictions cannot be supplied. It appears, however,
that at least thirty-five states now formally and openly favor
American goods in one way or another.2?
quirements for competitive bidding. See Texas Highway Comm'n v. Texas
Ass'n of Steel Importers, Inc., 372 S.W.2d 525, 529-30 (Tex. 1963). This issue,
however, is simply a matter of resolving conflicting state law and is peculiar to
each individual state. The issue is therefore beyond the scope of this Note.
16. For discussion of the economic issues, see Knapp, The Buy American
Act7 A Review and Assessment, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 430 (1961); Note, State "Buy
American" Policies--One Vice, Many Voices, 32 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 584 (1964);
sources cited in note 1 supra.
17. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221,
80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1969) (holding CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 4300-4305 (West 1966) un-
constitutional).
18. S.D. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 5-19-1 (1974 & Supp. 1979).
19. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:33-2, -3, (West 1955).
20. See INm. CODE ANN. § 5-16-8 (Burns Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. § 16.073
(1978); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 153.011 (Page 1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73,
§§ 1881-1887 (Purdon Supp. 1979); W. VA. CODE § 5-19-2 (1979).
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 1881 (Purdon Supp. 1979). See IND. CODE ANN.
§ 5-16-8 (Burns Supp. 1979); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 153.011 (Page 1978).
22. See P. Andrews, Status of State Laws, Regulations and Specifications
Applicable to or Restrictive of Non-Domestic Materials 1-2 (interoffice memo-
1980]
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It should be noted that the validity of preferences for prod-
ucts produced within the state over those produced in other
states is distinct from the issue of the validity of buy-American
preferences. Such "buy-in-state" preferences have been sepa-
rately addressed by the courts and are discussed only collater-
ally in this Note.23
1. THE GATT
The General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) 24 is a
multilateral international agreement signed by the United
States in 1947. The agreement now forms the central frame-
work for trade relations among its eighty-four signatory na-
tions.25 Despite some early controversy regarding the effect of
the GATT on inconsistent state law,26 it is now clear that the
GATT, like any valid treaty or executive agreement, is the
"supreme law of the land."27
Article M of the Agreement (the "national treatment" re-
randum, Chief Counsel's Office, Federal Highway Administration) (Aug. 25,
1971) (summarizing results of mail survey to all 50 states) (on fie with the Min-
nesota Law Review).
23. These provisions are clearly constitutional after Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976). The Alexandria Scrap case and the relation-
ship between buy-in-state and buy-American laws are discussed in text accom-
panying notes 73-75, 96-97, 106-107 infra.
24. Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pt. 5, at A-11 (1947), T.LA.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter cited as the GATT].
The text of the General Agreement has been amended from time to
time since 1947; the current text and a complete table of amending pro-
tocols is contained in 4 GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED Doc-
UmENTs. The BISD series is the GATT's public documents publication;
more basic volumes are called "Volumes" while others are designated
"Supplements." . .. For a comprehensive discussion of GATT legal
policy, see K. DAM, THE GATr-LAw AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC OR-
GANIZATION (1970).
Hudec, Retaliation Against "Unreasonable" Foreign Trade Practices: The New
Section 301 and GATT Nullification and Impairment, 59 MINN. L REV. 461, 461
n.2 (1975).
25. U.S. DEP'T Of STATE, THE TRADE DEBATE 7 (1978).
26. The leading investigation of and commentary on these issues is Jack-
son, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic
Law, 66 MICH. L. REV. 249 (1967) (concluding that the GA'T does supersede
state law). See also Note, United States Participation in the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 505 (1961).
27. Executive agreements like the GATT generally have supremacy over
state law, most likely derived from the supremacy clause of the Constitution,
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1942);
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937); K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp.
v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 75 N.J. 272, 280-81, 381 A.2d 774,
777-78 (1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978). There is no judicial author-
ity questioning the supremacy of the GAIT.
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quirement) obligates signatory nations to treat products of for-
eign and domestic origin equally:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no
less favorable than that accorded products of national origin in respect
of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale,
offering for sale, purchase, distribution or use.2 8
Paragraph 8(a) of article MI, however, creates a broad excep-
tion to this "national treatment" requirement:
The provisions of this article shall not apply to laws, regulations, or re-
quirements governing the procurement by governmental agencies of
products purchased for governmental purposes and not with a view to-
wards commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of
goods for commercial sale.2 9
Reading these two provisions together, "national treatment"
(or nondiscriminatory purchasing) is required in government
procurements not for governmental purposes or for commercial
resale. It should be noted that these provisions have not been
superseded by the new Government Procurement Code, which
applies only to procurements by the federal government;30 fur-
ther negotiations are required to establish agreements regard-
ing state and local governments. 31 Nothing in the Code or the
implementing legislation indicates that the above GATT re-
quirements are rescinded.
The two courts that have tested state buy-American legisla-
tion under the GATT reached opposite holdings due to differ-
ent interpretations of paragraph 8(a). In Baldwin-Lima-
Hamilton Corp. v. Superior Court,32 an American manufacturer
sought a writ of mandamus to enforce a California buy-Ameri-
can provision.33 The manufacturer had lost a bid to supply
water turbines for use in the production of electricity to a com-
petitor who intended to use foreign-produced turbines. Relying
on a 1905 California case in which electricity was considered a
"product" for purposes of interpreting a contract,34 the Bald-
win court held that electricity was a "good" under paragraph
8(a) of the GATT. The turbines were therefore to be used in
the "production of goods for sale," making the article H excep-
28. GATI, supra note 24, pt. I art. D1, para. 4.
29. Id. para. 8(a).
30. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
31. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2514(d) (West Supp. 1979); S. REP. No. 249, supra note
7, at 136-37.
32. 208 Cal. App. 2d 803, 25 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1962).
33. Id. at 808, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 801-02.
34. Id. at 819, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 808 (citing Terrace Water Co. v. San Antonio
Light & Power Co., 1 Cal. App. 511, 82 P. 562 (1905)).
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tion inapplicable.35 Having so concluded, the court found it un-
necessary to inquire whether the production of electricity is a
"governmental purpose" under article ]I, and the court held
California's statute unenforceable. 36
In the New Jersey decision, K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v.
North Jersey District Water Supply Commission,37 a foreign
manufacturer and New Jersey taxpayer sought an adjudication
declaring New Jersey's statute void and unenforceable. The ac-
tion was prompted by the Commission's request for bids for
water-pumping equipment.38 In upholding the buy-American
requirement, the court presented several reasons for conclud-
ing that supplying water to the public is a "governmental pur-
pose," entitling the Commission to immunity from article I
under paragraph 8(a). First, the court noted that the New
Jersey statute refers to the Water Supply Commission as an
"instrumentality exercising public and essential governmental
functions."3 9 Second, the court discussed the "unique nature of
water."4° Since the days of Blackstone, according to the court,
water has been considered "common property," which the state
merely transmits to the public in the general interest of health,
safety, and welfare, without regard to profit.41 The court cited
the Supreme Court's recognition of this principle in a decision
upholding a state law making it illegal to transport state water
to other states.42 Finally, the court relied upon previous judi-
cial characterizations of the water district as a "public body,
politic and corporate, ' 43 and as a "public trustee and public cu-
rator."44 The court concluded that the procurement of water
pumps fell within the GATT's paragraph 8(a) exception and
consequently that the application of the buy-American require-
ments was valid.45
35. 208 Cal. App. 2d at 819, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 808. See text accompanying note
29 supra.
36. 208 Cal. App. 2d at 823, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 809-10.
37. 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977) appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978).
38. Id. at 276, 381 A.2d at 776.
39. Id. at 284, 381 A.2d at 779 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:5-35 (1966)).
40. 75 N.J. at 285, 381 A.2d at 780.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 286, 381 A.2d at 781 (citing McCarter v. Hudson Water Co., 209
U.S. 349, 356 (1908)).
43. 75 N.J. at 285, 381 A.2d at 780 (quoting North Jersey Dist. Water Supply
Comm'n v. City of Newark, 103 N.J. Super. 542, 248 A.2d 249 (Super. Ct. Ch.
Div.), aff'd, 52 N.J. 134, 244 A.2d 113 (1968)).
44. 75 N.J. at 285, 381 A.2d at 780 (quoting City of Bayonne v. North Jersey
Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 30 N.J. Super. 409, 105 A.2d 19 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1954)).
45. 75 N.J. at 285, 381 A.2d at 780.
[Vol. 64.389
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One defect in the K.S.B. court's application of paragraph
8(a) is immediately apparent. Despite the fact that the New
Jersey statute applied to all state procurements, the court
looked only to the particular procurement at issue to ascertain
the statute's validity under the GATT. This limited inquiry is
inconsistent with the court's approach to both the commerce
clause and federal foreign affairs power issues. In those areas,
the court was concerned not only with the statute's effects on
the particular procurement project at issue, but also with the
overall impact of the buy-American statute on foreign com-
merce and on federal control of foreign affairs. 46 The GATT is-
sue is as much a constitutional matter as these other issues-
the court acknowledged that this is in fact a supremacy clause
question when it recognized that the GATr is the "supreme
Law of the Land."4 7 There is thus no distinction between the
GATT issue and the other issues which would justify the
court's limited inquiry.
A more crucial problem in judicial application of article I
is the lack of a standard, systematic test for interpreting and
applying paragraph 8(a). First, the K.S.B. court did not apply
paragraph 8(a) as a two-part test, as did the Baldwin court.
Paragraph 8(a) immunizes from article M only those procure-
ments which are both for governmental purposes and not with
a view toward commercial resale.48 The Baldwin court had no
need to determine whether the production of electricity was a
governmental function once it found that the electricity was in-
tended for commercial resale-the absence of one of the two re-
quired factors was sufficient. The K.S.B. court, however, fused
the two issues. It appeared to regard "governmental" and
"commercial" purposes as alternatives. Consequently, having
concluded that pumping water was a governmental function,
the court did not proceed to question whether the water was
for commercial resale and therefore beyond the scope of the
paragraph 8(a) exception.
A second aspect of this problem, which can be seen in the
K.S.B. court's treatment of paragraph 8(a), is the definition of
"governmental function,"49 a term crucial to circumscribing the
authority for state buy-American requirements under the
GATT. The K.S.B. court attempted to apply the term to the
46. See id. at 289-302, 381 A.2d at 782-89.
47. Id. at 280, 381 A.2d at 778.
48. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
49. The Baldwin court found no need to define the term. See text accom-
panying notes 35, 36 supra.
19801
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facts of the case, but its interpretation and application of the
term was shortsighted. The mere fact that the New Jersey stat-
ute creating the Water District Commission characterized that
body as exercising a "governmental function" 50 does not, with-
out more, mean that the Commission qualified for a paragraph
8(a) exception. Surely the scope of international agreements
cannot depend on the labels that state legislators choose to
give state instrumentalities. Nor does the court's discussion of
the "unique nature of water"51 as a public good supply much
guidance. Although this finding was helpful in settling the is-
sue on the particular facts of the K.S.B. case-the procurement
of water pumps-it could not be used to justify the application
of buy-American statutes to procurements unrelated to water.
Finally, the K.S.B. court's reliance on previous judicial charac-
terizations of the Commission's governmental functions is also
unsatisfying.52 These characterizations were dicta, used only to
support the validity of the Commission's rates and to establish
its contract rights5 3 Moreover, it is not relevant whether the
courts of a particular state-or even of the United States-have
previously characterized a function as a "governmental" one. If
an international agreement is to be given consistent, equal
treatment by the agreeing parties, courts must interpret its
terms from a broader perspective; they must recognize that is-
sues of interpretation have an international scope.
A broader perspective for defining the commer-
cial/governmental distinction can be found by reference to the
foreign sovereign immunity and act of state doctrines. Both
American 54 and foreign55 courts apply the distinction under
these doctrines. Since publication of the "Tate letter" in 1952,56
50. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
51. See notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
52. See notes 43-44 supra and accompanying text.
53. See City of Bayonne v. North Jersey Water Supply Comm'n, 30 N.J.
Super. 409, 418, 105 A.2d 19, 24 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1954); North Jersey Dist.
Water Supply Comm'n v. City of Newark, 103 N.J. Super. 542, 549, 248 A.2d 249,
252 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), aj'd, 52 N.J. 134, 244 A.2d 113 (1968).
54. See Victory Transp. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1964); National Arm. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Ni-
geria, 448 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Premier S.S. Co. v. Embassy of Algeria,
336 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Ocean Transp. Co. v. Republic of Ivory Coast,
269 F. Supp. 703 (ED. La. 1967); Et Ve Balik Kurumu v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp.,
25 Misc. 2d 299, 204 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1960).
55. See cases cited in Alfred Dunhill & Co. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S.
682, 702 n.15 (1975).
56. In the 'Tate letter," sent from acting State Department Legal Advisor
Jack Tate to the Attorney General of the United States, Tate presented the ex-
ecutive branch's view that the doctrine of sovereign immunity should not be
[Vol. 64.389
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immunity from suit in American courts has been granted to for-
eign sovereigns with respect to governmental or public acts,
but not with respect to commercial or private acts. Thus, in the
leading case of Victory Transport v. Comisaria General,5 7 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied
sovereign immunity to the Spanish government, which had
damaged an American-owned ship leased to Spain to transport
wheat. Since the wheat was destined for public sale in Spain,
the court concluded that Spain was acting "much like any pri-
vate purchaser of wheat" and that it therefore could not enjoy
sovereign immunity.5 8 Application of the sovereign immunity
body of law would make acceptable the K.S.B. court's fusion of
the two requirements in paragraph 8(a).5 9 In other words, if a
function were found to be a commercial one, like the public
sale of wheat, it would not be a governmental function.
Granted, use of this body of law will not guarantee a simple
application of the commercial/governmental distinction; too
few cases have been decided to make a clear line apparent.60
Courts and commentators have criticized the distinction as
"difficult to delineate,"6 ' as was a similar distinction that was
earlier applied to domestic sovereign immunity. 62 Whether the
distinction should or should not be drawn, however, is not at is-
applied when foreign nations act in commercial or private capacities. 26 DEP'T
STATE BuLa. 984-85 (1952).
The foreign sovereign immunity doctrine is codified in the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act of 1976 (28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976)). The effect the Act
will have on application of the distinction is unclear, as is the necessity of ap-
plying the distinction under the Act. Therefore, the body of law suggested here
fr reference in interpreting paragraph 8(a) is contained in the pre-Act foreign
sovereign immunity decisions, and decisions under the act of state doctrine
which is unaffected by the Act.
57. 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1964).
58. Id. at 361.
59. See notes 29, 48 supra and accompanying text.
60. See Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 322, 338 (1969).
61. Alfred Dunhill & Co. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 683, 715 (1975) (Powell, J., con-
curring); see Delaume, Public Debt & Sovereign Immunity: The Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act of 1976, 71 AM. J. IT'L L 399, 405 (1977); Lowenfeld, Claims
Against Foreign States-A Proposal for Reform of U.S. Law, 44 N.Y.U. L REV.
901, 918 (1969).
62. See Washington Township v. Ridgewood Village, 26 N.J. 578, 584, 141
A.2d 308, 311 (1958). The K.S.B. court cited the Washington Township case in
its refusal to apply the proprietary/governmental distinction previously used in
domestic sovereign immunity decisions. 75 N.J. at 287, 381 A.2d at 782. The fact
that this distinction caused problems under the domestic doctrine should not,
however, prevent the use of the distinction to help interpret the GATT. The
reasons for referring to the foreign sovereign immunity doctrine when inter-
preting paragraph 8(a), see text accompanying notes 64-66 infra, are not appli-
cable to the issue of domestic sovereign immunity.
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sue-the GATT clearly demands its use.63 Given that neces-
sity, use of foreign sovereign immunity law to help define that
distinction is desirable for several reasons. First, the distinc-
tion would be given more consistent meaning in this country
because each state court would not rely on state law. Second,
there would be more assurance that foreign nations ultimately
affected by decisions of American courts would recognize the
means by which the distinction is being interpreted since most
foreign courts also apply the commercial/governmental distinc-
tion in their own doctrines of sovereign immunity.64 Finally,
the Supreme Court is apparently satisfied with the foreign sov-
ereign immunity doctrine's approach to the commer-
cial/governmental distinction since the Court recently
extended that approach to yet another area of the law. With
approving citations to the "Tate letter," Victory Transport, and
the sovereign immunity decisions that followed, the Court in
Albert Dunhill & Co. v. Republic of Cuba65 held that the act of
state doctrine, like the foreign sovereign immunity doctrine,
will not apply when a foreign nation acts in a commercial or
private capacity.66 Thus, a body of law that is well recognized
in the United States and in the international community could
be used to interpret article I, encouraging consistent interpre-
tation of the commercial/governmental distinction by all mem-
ber nations of the GATT.
If paragraph 8(a) is interpreted by reference to the doc-
trine of foreign sovereign immunity, "governmental purpose"
would probably be narrowly defined, thus limiting the permissi-
ble scope of buy-American measures. The Victory Transport
decision limited sovereign immunity to "strictly political or
public acts about which sovereigns have traditionally been
quite sensitive. ' 67 State functions such as providing electricity
or natural gas to the public do not seem to fall within the limits
of this test. Moreover, it does not appear that any of the buy-
American statutes currently in effect were drafted with any
63. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
64. See, e.g., cases cited in Alfred Dunhill & Co. v. Republic of Cuba, 425
U.S. 682, 702 n.15 (1975).
65. 425 U.S. 682 (1975).
66. Id. at 703.
67. 336 F.2d at 360. One court went so far as to hold that the transportation
of grain for troops was not a governmental function under the doctrine. Et Ve
Balik Kurumu v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 25 Misc. 2d 299, 204 N.Y.S.2d 971
(1960). But cf. Oliver Am. Trading Co. v. Mexico, 5 F.2d 659, 665 (2d Cir. 1924),
cert. denied, 267 U.S. 596 (1925) (the operation of a national railroad is a "gov-
ernmental function").
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deference to the article III restrictions; no effort to exclude
state functions that are arguably not "governmental" is discern-
ible in those statutes. Thus, even under a broader test than
that applied in Victory Transport, most buy-American statutes
are probably overinclusive under article DI of the GATIT.
In summary, paragraph 8(a), which exempts some govern-
mental procurements from the general provisions of the GATIT,
has not yet been satisfactorily interpreted or applied. The pref-
erable interpretation would give a narrow meaning to the para-
graph, leaving little latitude for the operation of state buy-
Americanism.
DI. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The commerce clause of the Constitution 68 provides a
clearer basis for challenging state buy-American laws than
does the GATr. The power to "regulate Commerce with for-
eign Nations, and among the several States, '69 though framed
as an affirmative grant to the federal government, implies a lim-
itation on the states' power to regulate commerce. The
Supreme Court has relied on this "negative implication" to in-
validate state regulatory schemes that unduly interfere with
the free flow of interstate commerce,70 or that impair the ability
of non-residents to freely compete in the markets of the regu-
lating state.7 1 A general principle emerges from these deci-
sions: the state regulation is valid under the commerce clause
if that regulation rationally serves a valid state interest and
that interest outweighs the regulatory burden or discrimination
against interstate commerce.7 2
This general principle was not applied, however, in a recent
challenge to state interference in a state-created market. In
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,7 3 the state of Maryland had
instituted a program to encourage the elimination of aban-
doned automobiles on Maryland roads by paying bounties to
processors who destroyed such vehicles. The state, however,
made it difficult for out-of-state processors to participate in the
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
69. Id.
70. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 521-30 (1959); Southern
Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 763-84 (1945).
71. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 530-41 (1949); Baldwin
v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521-28 (1935).
72. City Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 186-87 (1950);
see Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1945). See generally L
TniBn, supra note 8, § 6-5, at 326.
73. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
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program.74 In essence, Maryland created a market but limited
access to that market to its own citizens. The Supreme Court
rejected an argument by a Virginia processor that Maryland's
scheme violated the commerce clause:
[U]ntil today the Court has not been asked to hold that the entry by
the State itself into the market as a purchaser, in effect, of a potential
article of interstate commerce creates a burden upon that commerce if
the State restricts its trade to its own citizens or businesses within the
State.. . . Nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause
prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from partici-
pating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens
over others.
75
Alexandria Scrap thus solidly established that states may, as a
valid exercise of their police power, favor their own citizens in
markets which owe their existence to the state itself.
This background of commerce clause principles must be
tempered by an understanding that state interference with for-
eign commerce is subject to greater restriction than is interfer-
ence with interstate commerce. Despite the fact that the
Constitution grants the interstate and foreign commerce pow-
ers to the federal government in the same clause and in the
same terms, and despite some very early authority that the two
federal powers imply equal limitations on the power of the
states, 76 modern decisions clearly articulate that states are left
with less power to affect foreign commerce than interstate com-
merce.7 7 This distinction was recently emphasized in Japan
74. Id. at 796-99.
75. Id. at 808, 810. The issue presented in Alexandria Scrap was perhaps
not as new to the Court as the quoted segment indicates. The Court had earlier
summarily affirmed a case that involved a similar issue. See American Year-
book Co. v. Askew, 409 U.S. 904 (aff'g mem. 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla. 1972)).
In American Yearbook, a three-judge District Court upheld a Florida statute re-
quiring that all state printing be done within the state of Florida. Summary af-
firmances are binding precedent, as pointed out in the K.S.B. opinion. 75 N.J.
at 297, 381 A.2d at 786 (citing Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1975)). Nu-
merous state court decisions have also upheld similar buy-in-state schemes.
See cases cited in American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719, 724 nn.29
& 30 (1972).
76. "The power to regulate commerce among the several States is granted
to Congress in the same clause, and by the same words, as the power to regu-
late commerce with foreign nations, and is coextensive with it." Thurlow v.
Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 578 (1847). See Pittsburg & S. Coal Co. v.
Bates, 156 U.S. 577, 587 (1895). But see Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 492-
93 (1904); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 273 (1875).
77. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 445-49
(1979). "The premise of appellees' argument is that the Commerce Clause
analysis is identical, regardless of whether interstate or foreign commerce is in-
volved. This premise, we have concluded, must be rejected.... [A] more ex-
tensive constitutional inquiry is required." Id. at 446. See also Bob-Lo
Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28, 34-40 (1948); Board of Trustees of the
Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933). The Court in Japan Line
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Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles.78 The Supreme Court held
that a California property tax could not be levied on cargo con-
tainers owned by Japanese shipping companies that were tem-
porarily in California ports. 79 The Court refused to rely on
earlier decisions that dealt with state taxation of the instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce.80 Instead, it held that two
additional inquiries must be made when foreign commerce is
affected: "first, whether the tax.., creates a substantial risk of
international multiple taxation, and, second, whether the tax
prevents the Federal Government from 'speaking with one
voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign gov-
ernments."' 8 1 In finding that application of the California tax
did not survive this second inquiry,82 the Court recognized both
the risk of retaliation by Japan and the lack of uniformity in
taxation of foreign commerce that would result if individual
states could impose such taxes. The Court also indicated that,
contrary to situations involving interstate commerce, interests
of the state have little relevance when foreign commerce is af-
fected.83 Although the Court weighs burdens on interstate
commerce against valid state interests, 84 such state interests
cannot excuse burdens on foreign commerce.
85
Although not heavily relied upon in Japan Lines, the im-
cited evidence that the framers of the Constitution intended less leeway for
states to affect foreign commerce than interstate commerce. 441 U.S. at 448
n.12. See also Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and
in Contemporary Comment, 25 MinN. I. REv. 432, 475 (1941), quoted in Japan
Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. at 448 n.12 ("there is no tenable
reason for believing that anywhere nearly so large a range of action was given
[to the federal government] over commerce 'among the several states' as over
that 'with foreign nations"').
78. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
79. Id. at 453-54.
80. Id. at 445-51. See note 77 supra.
81. 441 U.S. at 452.
82. "If other States follow California's example... foreign-owned contain-
ers will be subjected to various degrees of multiple taxation, depending on
which American ports they enter. This result, obviously, would make 'speaking
with one voice' impossible." Id. at 453.
83. See id. at 455-56.
84. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
85. The Court rather brusquely rejected the state of California's argument
that it has a legitimate interest in maintaining a fair and effective tax system
and that such interest should support the state's right to tax the shipping con-
tainers: 'These arguments are not without weight, and [California] may in-
deed be disadvantaged by our decision today. These arguments, however, are
directed to the wrong forum.... The problems ... admit only of a federal
remedy. They do not admit of a unilateral solution by the State." 441 U.S. at
457. See also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942); DiSanto v. Penn-
sylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 37 (1927); Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 202
(1925).
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port-export clause of the Constitution also supports the conclu-
sion that the federal government's foreign commerce power is
broader than its power to regulate interstate commerce. The
Supreme Court has explicitly held that this clause, which pro-
hibits states from levying "Imposts or Duties on Imports or Ex-
ports,"86 bolsters the federal foreign commerce power.87
Although most of the interpretational history of the clause is
devoted to the issue of when an item ceases to be an "import"
within the meaning of the clause, 88 the Court recently ignored
this issue. In Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages,89 the Court disre-
garded the fact that the goods in question had lost their charac-
ter as imports,90 and chose, instead, to consider whether
invalidating the state tax at issue would serve the purposes of
the clause.91 Among those purposes, according to the Court,
was the assurance that the federal government "'speak with
one voice' when regulating commercial relations with foreign
governments . . . which might affect foreign relations. '9 2 The
Court stated that this goal is undermined by any tax that dis-
criminates against foreign products.9 3 The import-export
clause is therefore particularly important here, because it pro-
vides additional, independent evidence of a constitutional
scheme to ensure that the United States presents a single co-
herent trade policy.
In K.S.B.,s4 the only major buy-American law decision to
address the issue,95 the court rejected a commerce clause at-
tack on the New Jersey statute. The court first acknowledged
86. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
87. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 57
(1933). See generally J. NowAK, HANDBOOK ON CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW 130-31
(1978).
88. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534 (1959); Gulf
Fisheries Co. v. MacInerney, 276 U.S. 124 (1928); Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. 29
(1872); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 436-45 (1827).
89. 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
90. Id. at 302 (White, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 283-94.
92. Id. at 285.
93. Id. at 285-86.
94. K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply
Comm'n, 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977) appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978).
95. Id. at 298-302; 381 A.2d at 787-89. Two other decisions need not be dis-
cussed in detail. The commerce clause was discussed briefly in a concurring
opinion in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221,
230-32, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800, 806-07 (1969) (Reppy, J., concurring); that opinion, how-
ever, antedated the Alexandria Scrap and Japan Line decisions, and is there-
fore of little importance now. A New York court also rejected a commerce
clause attack on its state's buy-American law, but its analysis does not justify
extensive comment. See note 11 supra.
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the traditional commerce clause principles limiting state power
and recognized that Alexandria Scrap was the most critical de-
cision because it dealt with preferences given in state-created
markets.96 The court discussed the relevance of Alexandria
Scrap:
An objection to the application of [Alexandria Scrap] to the facts
of this case might be advanced on the theory that a state's decision to
favor American as opposed to in-state producers does not reflect a le-
gitimate "local" purpose. In this manner, a Buy New Jersey scheme
would be exempt from Commerce Clause restrictions, but a Buy Amer-
ican scheme would not. We cannot accept this incongruous result....
It would be odd indeed to find that when a state becomes less paro-
chial and chooses in its own purchases to prefer the products of the na-
tion, as opposed to those of the state, its purpose becomes suspect
under the Commerce Clause.
9 7
Having concluded that Alexandria Scrap controlled, the court
went on to reject the argument that the impact on foreign com-
merce called for closer constitutional scrutiny. Relying on
early Supreme Court authority, the court found "no need in
this factual context to differentiate" between foreign and inter-
state commerce.
9 8
This final conclusion by the K.S.B. court-that there is no
need to differentiate between foreign commerce and interstate
commerce-cannot be supported after the Sulreme Court's de-
cision in Japan Line explicitly rejected that notion.9 9 Although
Japan Line involved a state tax and therefore a different type
of interference with foreign commerce than that presented by
buy-American legislation, the Court's rationale is broad enough
to apply to all foreign commerce issues. The Court stressed its
concern for avoiding foreign retaliation against American com-
merce and for establishing uniform state treatment of foreign
commerce. 00 It is clear that buy-American laws also invite for-
eign retaliation and lead to a lack of uniformity in state treat-
ment of foreign commerce.101 The federal government actively
opposes state buy-American laws for just these reasons. 02
The failure of the K.S.B. court to mention the import-ex-
port clause is particularly troubling. Because that clause bol-
96. 75 N.J. at 294-96, 381 A.2d at 785-86.
97. Id. at 298, 381 A.2d at 787.
98. Id. at 300, 381 A.2d at 788.
99. See note 77 supra.
100. See notes 81-82 supra and accompanying text.
101. Some states have buy-American policies, others do not some have ab-
solute provisions, others limited provisions; some apply to all procurements,
others to only certain products. See notes 17-21 supra and accompanying text.
Moreover, the federal government actively opposes state buy-Americanism.
See notes 146-150 infra and accompanying text.
102. See notes 146-150 infra.
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sters the federal commerce power and demands that a single
voice express the nation's foreign trade policy, s03 it is essential
to an analysis of buy-American legislation. In fact, the trial
court in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Commissioners ° 4
stated in dictum that the import-export clause alone would
have invalidated California's buy-American act, reasoning that
since a state may not tax foreign goods without congressional
consent, it may not impose an effective embargo of those
goods. 105
As suggested above, the K.S.B. court's virtually exclusive
reliance on Alexandria Scrap to dispose of the commerce
clause attack was misplaced, because foreign commerce was at
issue. But even if it were decided that the stricter foreign com-
merce principles do not apply to state-created markets, and
that state interests can be invoked to excuse interferences with
foreign commerce, buy-American statutes would still be sus-
ceptible to invalidation under the commerce clause because no
legitimate state interest is served by buy-American statutes.
Both the purpose and effect of buy-American laws is the pro-
tection of all American business. Any individual state, how-
ever, has police power over only its citizens. In preferring
American products, a state acts for the sake of those over
whom it has no responsibility, risking foreign retaliation that
"of necessity would be felt by the Nation as a whole."'01 6 Be-
cause neither the parties benefited by the preference nor the
parties burdened by them are fully represented in the enacting
state's legislature, the state is balancing risks against benefits
for people and interests beyond its borders. Thus, one of the
precepts of the Alexandria Scrap analysis-that the state be
serving its legitimate interest-is not present.1° 7
103. See notes 86-93 supra and accompanying text.
104. No. 899165 (Super. Ct. Los Angeles County Dec. 22, 1966).
105. See Comment, Constitutional Law.-Foreign Relations Power--Califor-
nia Buy American Act Held Unconstitutional on its Face as an Infringement of
Federal Government's Exclusive Power to Conduct Foreign Affairs, 3 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & Por. 164, 173 n.58 (1970).
106. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 453 (1979) (re-
ferring to the risk of trade retaliation by Japan if the California property tax
were applied to Japanese shipping containers).
107. As pointed out by the K.S.B. court, this line of reasoning would suggest
that a "buy-New Jersey" scheme would be valid, but a "buy-American" scheme
would not. The court could not accept this "incongruous result." See text ac-
companying note 97 supra. This result is perhaps less paradoxical than it first
appears, because the impact on foreign commerce caused by a "buy-in-state"
law is likely to be far less than that caused by a typical buy-American law.
Since no state has a broad enough industrial base to discriminate wholesale
against goods from other states, typical "buy-in-state" preferences relate to a
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Despite the various considerations pointing towards inva-
lidity of buy-American statutes, support for them could be mus-
tered by taking an entirely different approach to the issue. It
could be argued that Alexandria Scrap and its companion
case, National League of Cities v. Usery,x0 8 have carved out an
area of state power affirmatively limiting the federal commerce
power. 0 9 In National League of Cities, the Supreme Court
held that the commerce clause does not grant the federal gov-
ernment power to require the states to pay a minimum wage to
their employees." 0 Justice Rehnquist, writing for 'the Court,
cited tenth amendment cases to establish that the Court "has
never doubted that there are limits upon the power of Congress
to override state sovereignty, even when exercising its other-
wise plenary powers to tax or to regulate commerce.""' The is-
sue, according to Rehnquist, was "whether [setting salary and
hour schedules] are 'functions essential to separate and in-
dependent existence.' ,,12 Relying on figures showing the sig-
nificant costs of complying with the minimum wage law, he
found that setting salary and hour schedules was an essential
state function." 3 Although this line of reasoning does not sur-
face in the rather sketchy Alexandria Scrap opinion, it may
well underlie the Court's holding that state-created markets are
immune from traditional interstate commerce principles." 4
Thus, Alexandria Scrap may stand for the proposition that
states may do as they wish with state-created markets.
If this broad reading is accepted, it is uncertain whether
buy-American statutes could pass the test applied in National
very limited range of products or services. The scheme upheld in Alexandria
Scrap, for example, related only to processing of junk automobiles. See notes
73-74 supra and accompanying text. Similarly, a Florida law required merely
that all the state's printing needs be satisfied within the state. See American
Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla.), aFd mem., 409 U.S. 904
(1972). Buy-American laws, on the other hand, often cover all state procure-
ments or relate to more expensive and important products such as steel. See
notes 17-21 supra and accompanying text. There is thus a difference between
"buy-in-state" and buy-American schemes in the quantum of effect they have
on foreign commerce, which justifies treating them differently under constitu-
tional foreign commerce principles.
108. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (decided the same day as Alexandria Scrap).
109. The K.S.B. court viewed National League of Cities as being inapplica-
ble, apparently because the issue of "[w]hether Congress has the authority to
prohibit [buy-American statutes]" was not present. 75 N.J. at 295 n.9, 381 A.2d
at 785 n.9.
110. 426 U.S. at 852.
111. Id. at 842.
112. Id. at 845.
113. Id. at 846-52.
114. See 426 U.S. at 809-10; note 75 supra and accompanying text.
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League of Cities."5 Putting that test in context, the issue
would be whether favoring American products is essential to
the separate and independent existence of the state. Although
it seems obvious that such favoritism is not essential, one must
wonder whether the Court would faithfully apply that test. It is
difficult to see how paying less than the federal minimum wage
to state employees is essential to a separate and independent
existence, yet that is what the Court found." 6 National League
of Cities and Alexandria Scrap may thus portend the creation
of an area of state sovereignty within which buy-American stat-
utes stand secure. This conclusion, however, can only be char-
acterized as a speculative and broad interpretation of those
cases. Furthermore, controlling the state payroll serves an in-
terest far more directly important to the state than do buy-
American laws. Alexandria Scrap and National League of Cit-
ies therefore probably do not immunize state-created markets
from attack under the foreign commerce power.
In summary, the restrictions on state power that Supreme
Court decisions impose on foreign commerce probably apply
fully to state-created markets. Those restrictions are severe
and leave no room for state imposition of buy-American prefer-
ences.
IV. THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER
Peihaps the strongest argument for invalidating the buy-
American laws is that they interfere with the federal govern-
ment's foreign affairs power. Although the Constitution con-
tains no explicit grant of power to the federal government to
conduct foreign affairs, the Supreme Court has long recognized
that such power is implicit in the Constitution's concept of na-
tional sovereignty." 7 In interpreting the foreign affairs power
during the past century, the Supreme Court has often empha-
sized the federal government's exclusive control over that
power," 8 prompting one commentator to conclude, "whatever
115. See text accompanying note 112 supra.
116. See text accompanying note 113 supra.
117. Cohen v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 413 (1821) ('That the United
States form, for many, and for most important purposes, a single nation, has
not yet been denied. In war, we are one people. In making peace, we are one
people. In all commercial regulations, we are one and the same people."). See
also Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 555 (1870) (Bradley, J., concurring)
("[The federal government] is invested with power over all the foreign rela-
tions of the country, war, peace, and negotiations and intercourse with other
nations; all of which are forbidden to the State governments.").
118. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) ('"Me Federal Government,
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the division of foreign policy responsibility within the national
government, all such responsibility is reposed at the national
level rather than dispersed among the states and localities." 119
Although the Court's sweeping language 120 suggests that
state legislation touching upon foreign affairs is absolutely
banned, actual holdings of the Court suggest otherwise. Clark
v. Allen 12 1 and Zschernig v. Miller'22 have established that
state legislation which produces "incidental or indirect effects"
on foreign relations is not invalid as an encroachment on the
federal foreign affairs power.123 The rationale for this allow-
ance to the states is clear and sensible: the exercise of most, if
not all, state powers produces some remote effect on foreign af-
fairs.124 Burning oil to heat the state capitol, for example, has
an impact upon trade accounts with oil-exporting nations. If
the states are to be allowed to exercise any traditional powers,
these remote effects on foreign affairs must be disregarded.
The "incidental and indirect" test developed by the Court
makes such remote effects permissible while still protecting the
federal government's power to conduct foreign affairs authori-
tatively. Allen and Zschernig suggest that state-produced ef-
fects on foreign affairs are permissible only if they stem from
the exercise of a valid state power; otherwise, the effect on for-
eign affairs would not be "incidental" to legitimate state action.
Thus, in upholding a probate statute producing minimal effects
on foreign relations, the Allen Court thought it important that
representing as it does the collective interest of the forty-eight states, is en-
trusted with full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs with for-
eign sovereignties."). Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1888)
('The Chinese Exclusion Case") ("for national purposes, embracing our rela-
tions with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power");
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) ('The United States
[is] vested with the entire control of international relations, and with all the
powers of government necessary to maintain that control and to make it effec-
tive."); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) ("Power over external af-
fairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government
exclusively.").
119. I TRmE, supra note 8, § 4-5, at 172 (emphasis in original).
120. See note 118 supra.
121. 331 U.S. 503 (1946) (upholding a California probate statute making the
right of foreigners to inherit the property of Californians contingent upon the
granting of similar rights in the foreigner's home nation).
122. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
123. 389 U.S. at 433; 331 U.S. at 517. In Zschernig, the Supreme Court invali-
dated an Oregon statute virtually identical to the statute upheld in Allen, see
note 121 supra. Both opinions were written by Justice Douglas, who expressly
retained Allen's 'incidental and indirect" standard in Zschernig. According to
Douglas, changing factual circumstances since the Allen decision called for a
different result in Zschernig, twenty-two years later. Id. at 433.
124. 331 U.S. at 517.
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probate is traditionally a matter of state law.125
The state courts that tested buy-American legislation
under the foreign affairs power reached opposite conclusions.
In striking down the California statute in Bethlehem Steel Corp.
v. Board of Commissioners12 6, a California state court of ap-
peals relied heavily on the United States Supreme Court's ref-
erences to the exclusivity of the federal foreign affairs power.12 7
Noting that the California buy-American statute could be per-
ceived as a product of "selfish provincialism" that would invite
foreign retaliation, the court quickly concluded that the statute
produced more than "incidental or indirect" effects. 128 The
court made particular reference to then-current trade negotia-
tions that demanded the maintenance of goodwill with United
States' trading partners.129 According to the court, the mere
potential for an adverse effect on those negotiations was suffi-
cient to invalidate the statute. 30
In upholding the New Jersey buy-American statute, how-
ever, the K.S.B. court distinguished Bethlehem Steel by point-
ing out that New Jersey's statute was more limited in scope
than California's. 13 1 Furthermore, the court stated that the
New Jersey statute did not represent the "kind of intrusion"
into the foreign affairs power proscribed in Zschernig.132 Ac-
cording to the court, Zschernig prohibits judicial inquiry into
sensitive ideological issues, 133 an inquiry not required by the
New Jersey statute. 34 Finally, the court relied on paragraph
8(a) of the GATT (which it interpreted as excluding state
procurements from the GAT coverage) 135 and the federal
Buy-American Act to establish that the statute did not contra-
dict current federal policy. 3 6
Analysis of the K.S.B. court's reasoning reveals several
125. Id.
126. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 80
Cal. Rptr. 800 (1969).
127. Id. at 224-29, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 801-05. See note 118 infra.
128. Id. at 228, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
129. Id. at 228 n.11, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 804 n.11.
130. Id. at 228, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 805 (citing Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429,
441 (1968)).
131. 75 N.J. at 293, 381 A.2d at 784.
132. Id. at 292, 381 A.2d at 784.
133. Id. at 291-92, 381 A.2d at 783.
134. Id. at 292, 381 A.2d at 783. The statute, according to the court, did not
authorize "local units of government to engage in the sensitive business of
evaluating the politics of countries whose citizens seek to market their prod-
ucts in this State." Id.
135. See notes 37-44 supra and accompanying text.
136. 75 N.J. at 283, 381 A.2d at 784.
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major flaws, thus making Bethlehem Steel the better authority
on the effect of buy-American legislation on the foreign affairs
power. The first flaw stems from the limited reading of
Zschernig by the K.S.B. court. The court offered no support for
reading Zschernig as proscribing only state law that produces
one type of effect on foreign affairs. Although it is true that the
Zschernig opinion emphasizes the particular evil caused by the
Oregon statute at issue, the Supreme Court expressly retained
the Clark v. Allen "indirect and incidental" standard under
which the Court looked not to the kind of effect, but only to the
nature and importance of that effect.137 Thus, if a buy-Ameri-
can statute produces an effect on foreign relations that is other
than "indirect or incidental," that statute should not be saved
merely because the effect happens to be of a different type than
that proscribed in Zschernig.
Second, the difference in the scope of the California and
New Jersey statutes does not justify holding one invalid but
not the other. Regardless of the intended scope of any of the
statutes in question, the least that can be said is that the scope
of each is broad enough to provide favoritism to American pro-
ducers. If the statute is broad enough to accomplish that pur-
pose, it is broad enough to affect international trade. Moreover,
the Supreme Court has not emphasized the degree to which
foreign relations are affected. Judging from its rationale,138 the
"indirect or incidental" test appears to be more concerned with
the connection between the effect on foreign affairs and the ex-
ercise of a valid state power.
Third, the court should have questioned whether buy-
American measures serve any traditional state interest. This is
the same issue that was raised in the earlier discussion of the
commerce clause: Buy-American measures serve an overly
broad interest; they grant favoritism to all American producers
with attendant consequences for American producers as a
whole. 139 The effects on foreign relations produced by buy-
American statutes are therefore not incidental to a traditional
state power. Thus the Clark v. Allen rationale of excusing re-
mote side-effects stemming from traditional state functions
does not apply.14°
Fourth, the compatibility of buy-American laws with fed-
137. See note 123 supra and accompanying text.
138. See notes 124-125 supra and accompanying text.
139. See notes 106-107 supra and accompanying text.
140. See notes 121-125 supra and accompanying text.
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eral policy must be challenged. Instead of looking for an actual,
present conflict with federal policy, the K.S.B. court should
have tested for a potential conflict, as did the Bethlehem Steel
court.141 In Zschernig, the Supreme Court required only a po-
tential for conflict to invalidate the Oregon statute. 142 More im-
portantly, even if current federal policy is considered
determinative, a conflict with that policy is apparent upon faith-
ful application of Supreme Court precedent. Although the
K.S.B. court looked to the scope of the GA'IT and to a federal
statute (the federal Buy-American Act) to determine what the
federal policy was,143 the Supreme Court generally regards the
views of the State Department as definitive of current United
States foreign policy.144 In Zschernig, for example, both the
concurring and dissenting opinions referred to the State De-
partment's views of the Oregon statute; no reference was made
to conformity to federal statutes. 145 Had the New Jersey court
examined State Department policy, it would have discovered a
long-standing and active opposition to state buy-American
laws. Since at least 1958, the Department has monitored pend-
ing buy-American bills and attempted to persuade legislators
and governors that passage of the bills would not be in the na-
tional interest.14 The experience of the Department has also
indicated that these state laws are a significant issue in foreign
policy; the Department regularly receives objections from for-
eign embassies when states consider enacting buy-American
141. See note 130 supra and accompanying text.
142. Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas invalidated the statute in ques-
tion even though the federal government in its amicus brief did not contend
that the statute "unduly interfere[d] with the United States' conduct of foreign
relations." 389 U.S. at 434 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Cu-
riae at 6 n.5, Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968)). Justices Stewart and
Brennan, concurring, expressly employed a potential conflict test: "Resolution
of so fundamental a constitutional issue cannot vary from day to day with the
shifting winds at the State Department. Today, we are told, Oregon's statute
does not conflict with the national interest. Tomorrow it may." 389 U.S. at 443
(Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Harlan, who relied on the State Department's
nonopposition to Oregon's statute in his concurring opinion, was apparently
the only Justice to disagree. See 389 U.S. at 460.
143. See 75 N.J. at 283-85, 381 A.2d 780-84.
144. See, e.g., United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 321
(1936). See generally Boulder, The Office of the Legal Advisor: The State De-
partment Lawyer and Foreign Affairs, 56 AM. J. INT'L I 633, 673 (1962); Franck,
The Courts, The State Department and National Policy: A Criterion for Judicial
Abdication, 44 mN. L. Rav. 1101 (1960).
145. See note 142 supra. See also Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947).
146. Interview with Joel S. Spiro, Chief, Division of Special Trade Activities
and Commercial Treaties, Department of State, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 23,
1979) [hereinafter cited as Spiro Interview].
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provisions. 147 The adoption of the Government Procurement
Code does not alter this assessment of the Department's policy
on state buy-American laws. As discussed above, the Code
does not cover state and local procurements;148 it merely obli-
gates the federal government to inform state and local authori-
ties of the benefits of trade liberalization. 149 The Department of
State, however, will continue to oppose actively the adoption of
state and local buy-American policies.150
Finally, whether the foreign affairs power should be read to
allow states to legislate in this area must be questioned. Buy-
American laws are a response to complex economic problems
such as the need to protect American producers against unfair
foreign competition.' 5 ' Although it is understandable that state
legislators seek solutions to these problems, they lack the infor-
mation, expertise, experience, and resources necessary to deal
properly with the problems. Only the federal government is in
a position to accurately weigh factors as delicate and wide-
ranging in impact as the effects buy-American legislation have
on foreign relations or on international trade negotiations. Su-
perior federal competence thus suggests that courts strictly
limit state authority in the area of trade policy.'5 2
In summary, Supreme Court guidelines outlining allowable
state-produced effects on foreign relations show that state buy-
American laws impermissibly interfere with the federal foreign
affairs power. The laws significantly conflict with current fed-
eral policy and are not incidental to the exercise of a traditional
state function.
V. CONCLUSION
A growing number of states have enacted measures favor-
ing American producers over foreign competitors in the state
and local procurement market. The K.S.B. decision and the ab-
sence of any restrictions on state and local buy-Americanism in
the new Government Procurement Code have provided an aura
of validity to these measures. An examination of the relevant
147. Id.
148. See notes 10, 30-31 supra and accompanying text.
149. See GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT CODE, supra note 6, pt. I, para. 2.
150. Spiro Interview, supra note 146.
151. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
152. Cf. Morrison, Limitations on Alien Investment in American Real Es-
tate, 60 Mi-N. L REv. 621, 650 (1976) (state prohibitions on alien land invest-
ments) ("Since state legislatures are fundamentally not well informed on
international trade, on monetary and economic matters, or on the implications
of their decisions for American policy, they should not act in this field.").
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constitutional provisions and federal law and policies, however,
discloses three independent grounds for invalidating state buy-
American preferences.
First, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
requires equal treatment for foreign products in many procure-
ments to which buy-American provisions now apply. Procure-
ments which are both "for governmental purposes" and "not
with a view towards commercial resale" are exempted from the
GATT. Existing buy-American laws, however, are not limited
to such exempted procurements. The exemption is best inter-
preted by reference to the act of state and foreign sovereign im-
munity doctrines which would give a narrow meaning to the
exemption. Under such an interpretation, or even under a
broader one, buy-American laws are invalid under the GATT.
Second, state buy-American laws are invalid under the
commerce clause. The power of states to affect foreign com-
merce is far more strictly limited than is their power to affect
interstate commerce-essentially no state regulation is permit-
ted. Buy-American policies, however, are clearly intended to
affect foreign commerce by limiting imports and controlling un-
fair foreign competition. The commerce clause, as well as the
import-export clause, constitutionally mandates that the nation
"speak with one voice" in foreign trade. Buy-Americanism, if
implemented at the state level, makes impossible such singu-
larity of policy. Moreover, the interests served by buy-Ameri-
can policies, as well as the attendant risks, are national in
scope and therefore beyond the police power of the individual
state enacting the policy.
Third, buy-American laws interfere with the power to con-
duct foreign affairs, a power that is wholly vested in the federal
government. Although "incidental or indirect" effects on for-
eign relations are tolerable, state buy-American laws signifi-
cantly conflict with current United States foreign policy.
Moreover, the effect that they have on foreign affairs is not inci-
dental to a traditional state function, since the laws seek to
favor interests beyond the state's borders. Finally, because the
federal government is better equipped than the states to deal
with matters of foreign policy, state interference with federal
policy should be strictly limited.
[Vol. 64:389
